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All Quiet on the Service Front?
his book starts with a strike—almost. On June 16, 2011, more
than four thousand workers at four New York Macy’s stores 
came within hours of walking off the job. It would have been the 
first such action at the storied department store since 1972. In­
stead, in the wee hours of the morning, representatives of Local 1 -S 
of the Retail, Wholesale and Department Store Union (RWDSU) 
agreed to a tepid five-year deal and called off the strike. One day 
later, workers at a nearby Target store in Valley Stream, New York, 
cast ballots in a widely watched unionization drive. Like most such 
elections in the last twenty years, it failed. Hopes for a beachhead 
of unionism in big-box retail were dashed, at least temporarily.
Shortly after these events, I began interviewing salespeople from 
two of the unionized Macy’s stores. Opinions on the settlement 
were not hard to find. aWe should’ve went out,” said Jerry.1 "It was 
right before Father’s Day—bust their chops! We should’ve, but 
after all that we got 65 cents.” Ethel felt the same: “We should’ve 
had a strike,” she told me. “I think they sold out. We got a 65- 
cent raise the first year, but they knew we wanted a dollar, so they
1. This and all other workers’ names have been changed to conceal their identities.
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screwed us.” Carol, however, was more ambivalent: “If they [the 
union] had said so, we wouldVe gone on strike. But it’s up to each 
individual, whether to show up or not. Because you are trying to 
live for yourself and if you are striking you never know how long 
that would be.” Harry, a stock clerk in his early twenties, was one 
of these individuals. “Me personally, I still would’ve went to work,” 
he said, “because if you st rike you’re not going to get paid. I just do 
what I have to do.”
A few months later, when speaking with New York City Tar­
get workers, 1 found that some were aware of the recent drive 
to organize. Joan, a cashier, knew that “Valley Stream was trying 
to go union,” and described a concerted effort by management to 
avoid this: “One of our executives [managers] was pulling people 
into rooms and telling them, Tf these people come in here, don’t 
even bother talking to them.’” Karissa, a summertime salesperson, 
noted that the first time she ever heard about unions was “a week 
after I got back [in June 2011]. I heard about Valley Stream and 
they showed us a video, the HR people. I really didn’t care to see 
the video; they pulled me away from my work section and I was 
like 'what am I doing here?”’ Anthony, a stock clerk who had also 
seen the video, was wary 1 might be an organizer and asked for as­
surances to the contrary.“1 heard they [unions] are trying to target 
the stores in the New York area,” he stated, “but if they come by 
I’m not signing up because I don’t want to be a part of it.” Though 
many were unaware of the Valley Stream drive and some unfamil­
iar even with the concept of unions, several, like Joan, were clearly 
prounion: “We could use the union. Because what is the union 
supposed to do? Fight for the people that work for the company!”
Alongside fast-food, retail is among the most recognizable 
low-wage industries in twenty-first-century America. From Sat­
urday Night Lives Best Buy and Target skits to Walmart as the
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proverbial rock bottom in Fun with Dick and Jane, it has become 
synonymous with low-wage, unstable, “stopgap” work (Tannock 
2001; Appelbaum, Bernhardt, and Murnane 2003; Coulter 2014). 
Average wages for frontline workers are 30 percent below the 
private-sector average, and those in general merchandise—which 
includes Macy’s, Target, and Walmart—are 44 percent lower, at 
$11.23 per hour (U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics 2014a). As might 
be expected, the industry is also broadly nonunion: fewer than 5 
percent of retail workers are in unions today, down from more 
than 10 percent in 1983 (Hirsch and Macpherson 2014). On the 
face of it, retail thus appears ripe for organizing and the boost 
in wages this has historically brought. Some go further, arguing 
that big-box retail provides “the template of twenty-first-century 
capitalism” (Lichtenstein 2006) and that it is “hard to imagine a 
revitalized and powerful labor movement in the U.S. without a 
unionized Wal-Mart”—or retail sector, for that matter (Moody 
2007,234).
Yet the experiences related above suggest deeper obstacles: first 
and foremost, the tenacity of employer resistance; second, the ti­
midity of many existing unions. But deeper still are the subjective 
hurdles faced by many workers: Why are wages so low? Why can’t 
I afford the company’s health insurance? Is management on my 
side? Are my coworkers? What are the alternatives? What, for that 
matter, is a union? From a certain standpoint, one could “impute” 
answers to these questions and try to relay them to workers—as 
could groups that aim to advance their interests. A more scientific 
and ultimately more democratic approach, however, is to contex­
tualize workers’ own answers within a robust description of their 
lived experience. If we can grasp the relationship between work 
and consciousness in this paradigmatic service sector, we can bet­
ter assess the forces for change.
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Labor Movements in Crisis and Renewal
Occurring so close in space and time, the events of June 2011 
appeared to symbolize the twin dilemmas of the American labor 
movement: cautious conservatism in its remaining areas of 
strength and inability to gain traction in new ones. But the crisis 
of American labor is hardly new. While the slide in working-class 
power that began after President Reagan's crushing of the 1981 
strike by the Air Traffic Controllers is well known, stagnation was 
evident long before, with some even pointing to the passage of 
the Taft-Hartley Act in 1947. By this account, it would seem that 
America s industrial unions, if not those in the older American 
Federation of Labor (AFL), began to die only shortly after their 
birth. The tragedy of American labor, when compared with its Eu­
ropean counterparts, consists precisely in this belated birth, early 
decline, and the failure to transmit its practices to a new genera­
tion of service workers.
Plenty of ink has been spilled trying to explain labor's predica­
ment and identify the sources of its renewal. But broadly absent 
is a sustained interrogation of the service labor process and how 
it affects workers' will to organize. In what follows, I present the 
highlights of this decline-and-renewal debate in order to tease out 
four underexamined questions. These questions, in slightly differ­
ent form, were central to debates about the future of industrial 
unions in the 1970s and '80s; among sociologists of service work, 
they have received more recent attention with respect to work it­
self. Yet advocates of union renewal have largely sidestepped them, 
focusing instead on organizing tactics, union forms, or worker de­
mographics (Bronfenbrenner et al. 1998; Clawson 2003; Cobble 
1991b; Fine 2005; Milkman 2006; Ness 2005). This book attempts 
to unite these divided fields and, as Juravich and Bronfenbrenner
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admonish us, “bring the study of work back to labor studies” 
(2005).
Front and center in most accounts of labor’s decline since the 
1970s is a set of processes summed up by the word “globaliza­
tion.” Defined as the expansion of economic activity beyond the 
boundaries of nation-states, globalization has been cited time 
and again as the cause tout court of the weakening of workers’ 
bargaining power. Alan Tonelson’s Race to the Bottom (2002) is a 
primary expression of this, with Beverly Silver (2003) providing 
a much-needed rejoinder. In line with such expectations, unions 
in private-sector manufacturing—those most exposed to global 
competition—have suffered severe losses, declining in the United 
States from nearly 8 million members and a 40 percent density rate 
in 1973 to only 1.4 million members and 10 percent today (Hirsch 
and Macpherson 2014). In response, authors such as Kim Moody 
(1997), Kate Bronfenbrenner (2007), and Jamie McCallum (2013) 
have considered the utility of so-called global unions. But as Ruth 
Milkman (2013) points out, it is not only in globally exposed in­
dustries that U.S. unions have fallen: membership in construction 
and trucking—place-bound industries—has declined almost as 
much. Additional forces must be at work.
Industrial relations scholars cite “the emergence of a nonunion 
model” and attendant union resistance among U.S. employers (Ko- 
chan, Katz, and McKersie 1994). During the postwar heyday of 
collective bargaining firms such as Kodak, Sears, and Thompson 
Products honed their skills at union avoidance through a combi­
nation of welfare provision and punitive oversight (Jacoby 1997). 
Thomas Kochan, Harry Katz, and Robert McKersie (1994) de­
scribe a shift even within unionized firms toward “human resource 
management” (HRM). By the 1980s, this approach had gained 
enough momentum—and was bolstered by Japanese-style “lean
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production”—to constitute what Michael Goldfield calls a “capital­
ist offensive” that contributed significantly to union decline (1987, 
189). To combat such maneuvers, some call for unions to pursue 
“rank-and-file intensive” and “comprehensive organizing” (Bron- 
fenbrenner et al. 1998; Voss and Sherman 2000). Others consider 
new forms of worker organization that could circumvent employer 
antiunionism (Cobble 1991b; Fine 2005; Heckscher 2001).
Employers, however, do not act alone. As Moody notes, “The 
decline [of U.S. unions] has a definite turning po in t. . .  the years 
1980-81” (2007, 1). The “Reagan Revolution” consisted of a series 
of government actions that greatly augmented the power of capital 
over labor: financial and industrial deregulation, reduced taxes on 
wealth, the firing, by presidential fiat, of more than eleven thou­
sand air traffic controllers, and the restructuring of the National 
Labor Relations Board (NLRB) from an ostensibly neutral body 
to one with a decidedly probusiness tilt. Such “reforms” did not 
end with Republican reign in 1992 but continued under Clinton, 
whose signature “achievements” were the signing of the North 
American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) and the curtailing of 
welfare benefits. Combined with more recent attacks on union 
rights in former strongholds such as Wisconsin, Michigan, and In­
diana, the state (writ large) has played an important role in deter­
mining that “by the 2010s ...  the New Deal labour relations system 
was a dead letter” (Milkman 2013, 647). Movements for political 
reform, mostly local, have appeared and been further publicized 
by scholars such as Stephanie Luce (2004), whose study of living 
wage struggles helped them take center stage in the fight against 
inequality.
An older line of thinking also places blame on labor’s doorstep— 
more specifically, on U.S. unions’ bureaucratic leadership. As early 
as the 1960s Art Preis claimed that “union officials want to stifle
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the class struggle, not lead it” ([ 1964] 1972, 11). This criticism 
continued through the 1970s and gained renewed traction in the 
1980s, as many leaders proved unwilling to combat the onslaught 
of concessions and plant closures (Aronowitz 1972; Bluestone and 
Harrison 1982; Moody 1988; Piven and Cloward 1979,96-180). In 
1995, dissatisfaction reached the upper echelons of U.S. labor, cul­
minating in the election of John Sweeney as president of the AFL- 
CIO on a promise of renewed growth through organizing. Nearly 
two decades and a major split2 later, this promise has not been 
fulfilled—some argue because of the entrenchment of udo nothing 
unionism” (Lopez 2004). The remedy, they assert, is rank-and-file 
activism that can challenge leaders and invigorate peer-to-peer or­
ganizing (Burns 2011; Early 2011; Moody 2007).
A final oft-cited cause of union decline is more secular in na­
ture. Touted by some as “the great hope of the twentieth century” 
(Fourastie 1949) and by others as a force for uthe end of ideology” 
(Bell 1960, 1973), the rise of service employment is frequently 
given as a reason for union decline due to the sector's supposedly 
less alienating conditions. Today it is hardly useful to speak of “ser­
vices” as such since they constitute more than three-quarters of ad­
vanced capitalist workforces. Of the five ma jor subgroups—health 
and education, retail and personal services, business and financial 
services, transportation, and government and security— theories 
of union obsolescence are clearly disproven for the first, fourth 
and fifth, which boast some of the highest unionization rates in the 
developed world.3 But for the second and third, which encompass
2. That of the Change to Win (CtW) rival federation in 2005.
3. It is arguable that “transportation,” with its material rather than interper­
sonal focus and long-standing traditions of conflict and unionism, more closely 
approximates goods production than service provision.
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nearly half of U.S. workers and are less than 10 percent organized, 
union irrelevance appears hauntingly true. Why then are unions 
so broadly absent here, particularly in the low-wage sector where 
conditions seem to cry out for redress? Is there something intrinsic 
to interactive services that mitigates unionization and its seeming 
prerequisite, a collective, oppositional consciousness? And how 
are such workplaces changing? Are they tending in directions that 
might encourage or further inhibit worker organizing?
These are the questions this book seeks to answer. Through a 
focused comparison of two iconic department stores in New York 
City, I interrogate the organization and social relations of service 
work, how it evolves, and how these forces shape workers’ con­
sciousness. I integrate these findings to identify the obstacles and 
inroads to service-sector organizing in the United States. This is 
aided by the work of those who have probed these dynamics in the 
past. It is to a consideration of their contributions that I now turn.
Work and Consciousness
Perhaps the most well-known author to address the question of 
workplace consciousness is Michael Burawoy. Arguing in Manu­
facturing Consent that “conflict and consent are not primordial 
conditions but products of the particular organization of work,” 
he refocused discussions of worker consciousness on the labor 
process (1979, 12). Work, in his view, is “relatively autonomous” 
from the wider social environment and its changes under monop­
oly capitalism largely responsible for the decline in labor militancy. 
Yet Burawoy’s research, which involved extended participation in 
a Chicago-area machine shop, uncovered anything but a mono­
lithic workplace. On the contrary, occupational divisions and the 
evolving character of worker-manager relations were found to
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differentially shape workers’ attitudes and behavior. These same 
dimensions—work organization and employment relations— 
have since gained currency as the defining features of manufactur­
ing. But there is discontinuity with services. Service-work scholars, 
propelled by Arlie Hochschild’s (1983) concept of emotional labor 
and Robin Leidner’s (1993) of the service triangle, have proceeded 
in more subjective directions and only in the last decade begun to 
reconsider structure (Belanger and Edwards 2013). The challenge 
at hand is thus to disentangle each debate and unite their core 
insights.
Work Organization
For much of human history, the organization of work has been 
simple: one person performed all tasks needed to produce a useful 
thing, be it a sharpened spear, a pair of shoes, or a plate of food. Co­
operation, to be sure, emerged very early but was mainly confined 
to large-scale hunting in preagricultural societies and large-scale 
construction in agricultural ones. It was only with the Industrial 
Revolution of the late 1700s that cooperation and a detailed divi­
sion of labor became widespread. Adam Smith ([ 1776] 1993) was 
the first to recognize this; Karl Marx took the analysis further: “A 
large number of workers working together, at the same time, in 
one place (or, if you like, in the same field of labour), in order to 
produce the same sort of commodity under the command of the 
same capitalist, constitutes the starting point of capitalist produc­
tion” ([1867)1976, 439). If collectivization is fundamental to the 
capitalist labor process, then it is surely a defining feature of its or­
ganization. Embedded within collectivized work is also the poten­
tial for domination. Control from above, or “command” as Marx 
puts it, thus constitutes another dimension of work. And just as
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collectivization makes possible but does not require control, so do 
both provide the necessary yet insufficient conditions for simpli­
fication. Smith, again, was the first to take note. Examining work 
in a pin factory, he found the complexity of tasks greatly reduced 
from preindustrial methods:
One man draws out the wire, another straights it, a third cuts it, a 
fourth points it, a fifth grinds it at the top for receiving the head; to 
make the head requires two or three distinct operations; to put it on, 
is a peculiar business, to whiten the pins is another; it is even a trade 
by itself to put them into the paper; and the important business of 
making a pin is, in this manner, divided into about eighteen distinct 
operations, which, in some manufactories, are all performed by dis­
tinct hands. ([ 1776] 1993, 12)
Harry Braverman later described this same process as the “the 
separation of conception and execution’’ or the de-skilling of 
frontline work (1974, 79).
Service jobs, however, are harder to collectivize than their goods- 
producing counterparts. When a commodity is consumed simul­
taneously with its production and involves personal interaction, it 
can hardly be stockpiled; it also presents fewer opportunities for 
worker cooperation. Nevertheless, the twentieth century saw the 
emergence of large-scale service enterprises in health care, educa­
tion, hospitality, and retail. Clearly services can be collectivized, or 
at least aggregated, even if unevenly. But control and complexity 
are more problematic. Leidner’s (1993) study of fast-food serv­
ers and insurance salespeople uncovered alternate axes of control: 
customers, rather than simply providing uraw material” for ser­
vice performance, were unpredictable agents whom managers and 
workers sought to regulate; in other instances, customer reports 
were used by managers to monitor workers. Hence the old dyad of
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worker-manager becomes a triad in services, with multiple path­
ways for alliance and conflict.
Hochschild also identified service work's unique content. 
Rather than manipulating things, as in goods production, or sym­
bols, as in intellectual production, service provision “require!sj 
one to induce or suppress feelings in order to sustain the outward 
countenance that produces the proper state of mind in others” 
(1983, 7). She called this “emotional labor” and distinguished 
between “surface acting,” in which workers engage in superficial 
encounters, and “deep acting,” in which they develop long-term 
relationships. Though Hochschild's emphasis on the interper­
sonal remains largely unchallenged, the intensity of emotional 
labor, as well as patterns of alliance and conflict and their impact 
on consciousness vary widely among workplaces. They require 
firsthand investigation.
Employment Relations
Burawoy's (1979) study, like many before and since, showed 
how not simply work itself but also its embedding social relations 
shape consciousness. The most fundamental relation in all but a 
few workplaces is the wage-for-effort bargain: workers agree, often 
tacitly, to show up at certain times, expend energy in predeter­
mined ways, and generally submit to employers' direction. In re­
turn they receive more or less wages, security, or comfort, and these 
are more variable than relations of ownership. Sanford Jacoby 
(1997), for example, traces the rise and persistence of American 
“welfare capitalism” in which large employers provided gener­
ous wages and benefits—as well as sophisticated paternalism—in 
order to keep unions out. Unions and collective bargaining also 
reveal the elasticity of wages and workplace relations. Indeed, a
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central finding of Manufacturing Consent was that unionization 
had transformed the managerial strategy of work speedup into a 
fair “game” in which workers could “make o u t”
Since the late 1970s, however, such fairness and preemptive gen­
erosity have largely vanished. Kochan, Katz, and McKersie argue 
that “concession bargaining, workplace innovations, and the rise 
in the importance of nonunion human resource management sys­
tems represent a breakdown of the industrial relations system that 
was shaped by New Deal labor policies and the early institution­
alization of collective bargaining during and immediately after 
World War II”(1994, 21). What they call the “nonunion industrial 
relations system” originally looked much like welfare capitalism. 
But as union decline became more permanent, it morphed into a 
low-road model epitomized by Walmart and McDonald’s. Work­
ers at Walmart and similar firms often receive sub-living wages 
and have little access to benefits and almost no job security; many 
also struggle—and fail—to attain full-time hours or predictable 
schedules (Kalleberg 2011; Lichtenstein 2006, 2009). The decline of 
organized labor thus seems to have accentuated the “mean” side 
of many U.S. firms (Gordon 1996).
Services have been more central to discussions of employment 
relations than to those about work organization—probably be­
cause service employers, particularly retailers, were among the 
early innovators in this field. Susan Benson (1986, 143) notes 
how prewar department stores purveyed “[wjelfare work [that] 
included store facilities and social service programs for work­
ers”; Jacoby (1997) details Sears’s deployment of high wages, 
profit sharing, and patriarchy to inculcate loyalty; and Bethany 
Moreton (2009) traces the southern origins and compliance ef­
fects of Walmart’s morning rituals and gendered paternalism. In 
sum, service workers have often been guinea pigs for the latest
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managerial trends, which typically involve altering pay, benefits, 
or supervisory style. But how these are arranged in individual 
workplaces and how they are received by workers remain open 
empirical questions.
How It All Evolves
Taken together, work organization and employment relations 
compose the total labor process that workers experience. At any 
given time these are relatively fixed, but a prime feature of work 
under capitalism is that it constantly changes. How and why this 
happens has been the subject of much debate. Since the 1970s, 
three general positions have been staked out.
Braverman (1974) put forward a radical de-skilling hypothesis 
that saw capitalists as increasing control through observation, rou- 
tinization, and mechanization of workers' tasks. Later cont ributors 
in the same vein emphasized worker resistance to such degrada­
tion, with Richard Edwards (1979) and Burawoy (1979) identify­
ing alternate employer strategies when de-skilling is impractical. 
Upgrading theorists, for their part, assert the opposite. Robert 
Blauner (1964) and Daniel Bell (1973) cite technological change; 
Michael Piore and Charles Sabel (1984) point to normative shifts 
in industrial relations; and lean production, or “Toyotist,” enthu­
siasts argue that the rational interests of employers compel them 
to seekahigh performance workplaces" whose spread raises overall 
skill levels (Whitfield 2000; Ohno 1988; see Dohse, Jurgens, and 
Malsch 1985 for a critique). Last, contingency theorists take issue 
with the very directionality of change. Stephen Wood (1987) and 
Paul Attewell (1987, 1990) question whether degradation can ever 
be empirically verified, Roger Penn (1986) sees frontline de-skilling 
as offset by growing maintenance and management staff, and
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Cynthia Cockburn (1983) argues that gender, rather than job 
complexity, plays a major role in skill designations.
Service work has rarely been studied through the lens of these 
hypotheses. While Braverman included services in the purview of 
his theory, and even dedicated a short chapter to their investiga­
tion, both his and more recent efforts (e.g., Ritzer 1993) are em­
pirically weak (with the exception of Curley and Royle 2013). How 
frontline service jobs are changing and to what extent they are be­
coming more skilled, less skilled, or simply more differentiated are 
thus broadly open questions that this book seeks to answer.
Class Consciousness
Working-class consciousness presents a different can of worms. 
Predicated on the social division between capitalists and workers, 
it has long been sought by activists as a key ingredient for progres­
sive change. Historically, it is also on the basis of class that work­
ers have formed the most effective unions and political parties. 
Michael Mann (1973) defines class consciousness as having four 
distinct moments:
class identity—the definition of oneself as working-class, as playing a dis­
tinctive role in common with other workers in the productive process.. .  
class opposition— the perception that the capitalist and his agents consti­
tute an enduring opponent to oneself... class totality—the acceptance of 
the two previous elements as the defining characteristics of (a) ones total 
social position and (b) the whole society in which one lives. Finally comes 
the conception of an alternative society, a goal toward which one moves 
through the struggle with the opponent. (1973, 13)
Ethnographers and historians critique this formulation. Rick Fanta­
sia (1988, 11) believes it ignores the''transformative associational
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bonding” workers undergo in struggle, while Ira Katznelson (1986, 
14-20) argues that consciousness is but one stage in a historical 
(and typically national) process of “class formation” (see also 
Thompson 1963). But to study the localized consciousness of 
workers not in open struggle—as most workers are most of the 
time—Mann’s schema provides the most useful starting point, if 
needing some modification. First, it is unlikely for experience in 
a single workplace to engender views of “class totality” or of an 
“alternative society.” Excluding these “higher levels” leaves the first 
two—identity and opposition. Second, Mann’s “identity” has two 
points of reference: “with other workers” and “in the productive 
process.” Because of this, class identity appears to consist more di­
rectly of “co-worker solidarity”—identifying the interests of col­
leagues with one’s own—and “occupational identity”—identifying 
with the role one plays on the job (Cobble 1991b). This yields a 
three-part model of what might be termed “workplace-based” 
class consciousness.
Aside from overblown assertions to the contrary, the question 
of whether services can generate this or other forms of class con­
sciousness has been approached only at the margins. Hochschild 
and others have linked the performance of emotional labor to self- 
alienation and feelings of inauthenticity (Hochschild 1983; Whar­
ton 1993; Erickson and Wharton 1997; Sloan 2007). This dynamic 
can be extended to also limit occupational identity. Eor another, 
the triangle of service relations and the alliances they enable may 
also reduce workers’ opposition to management (Bolton and Hou­
lihan 2010; Leidner 1996). But the effects of sex-typing are more 
ambiguous. Many service jobs are explicitly gendered, with “car­
ing labor” often defined as an extension of “feminine” duties (En­
gland 1992; Guy and Newman 2004). To the extent this ideology 
is effective it may hinder job identity and opposition. Where not
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effective, however, such “special oppression” can produce gender 
solidarity and opposition (Cobble 1991a; Hartmann 1981; Jones 
2001). Furthermore, where employers encourage workers to have 
a “positive mental attitude,” authoritarian supervision may be less 
effective than supportive, collaborative techniques (Leidner 1993; 
Korczynski 2002; Sherman 2007). Such “soft” management leads 
one to expect less opposition from workers.
These expectations about how services shape consciousness lie 
at the heart of this book. They are tackled in chapter 6, after the 
contours of work at two retailers have been fully laid out. What re­
mains before embarking on this journey is to describe my research 
process—a task that occupies the rest of this chapter.
The Research Process
In early 2011 I set out to understand the experience of contem­
porary service workers and the chances for militancy among them. 
I wanted to study more than one site and hear workers’ direct 
opinions on their jobs, workplace politics, and U.S. society. Partic­
ipant observation, for all its merits, would have made these goals 
hard to achieve. 1 therefore opted to conduct a series of in-depth 
interviews rather than embed myself as a frontline employee. But 
where to start?
Of the nine major service sectors defined by the U.S. Census,4 
education and health, wholesale and retail, and professional and busi­
ness services are the largest. The first are mainly in the public sector
4. Wholesale and retail trade, transportation and utilities, information, finan­
cial activities, professional and business services, education and health services, 
other services, and public administration (although transportation and utilities 
have high proportions of production-type jobs) (U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics 
2014d).
All Quiet on the Service Front? 17
and because of that are highly unionized (Hirsch and Macpherson 
2014). Professional and business services, though only 3 percent 
unionized, employ mostly professional workers whose average 
wages are well above the private-sector mean (U.S. Bureau of 
Labor Statistics 2014a, 2014d). In retail, however, fewer than 
10 percent of workers are managers or professionals, and their 
average wages are just 63 percent of the private-sector mean 
(ibid.). Nearly 12 percent of all U.S. workers are employed in re­
tail, but fewer than 5 percent of them are union members. Retail 
is America’s largest low-wage, nonunion service industry and thus 
fertile terrain for the exploration of class consciousness.
Within retail I focused on department stores, and among them 
I studied those in New York City. Home to some of the most well- 
known traditional retailers, New York has only since the late 1990s 
been colonized by big-box and discount chains (Angotti 2008). 
Macy’s in particular has its oldest—and in four cases unionized— 
stores in the city, and I chose these both because they likely re­
semble earlier modes of selling and because they offered a window 
into existing retail unionism. Among the big-box entrants to the 
New York market—which do not include Walmart—I chose Tar­
get for comparison. Target is the third-largest discounter after 
Walmart and Costco, is completely nonunion, and is seen by many 
as a trendsetter in the genre (Spector 2005). The uniqueness of 
New York’s economy and workforce also made it imperative that 
any comparison case be in the same place (Sassen 2001). Table 1.1 
displays key characteristics of both Macy’s and Target for the year 
my research began.
Between June 2011 and August 2012 I spent several hundred 
hours roaming around two unionized Macy’s and three nonunion 
Target stores, all within the five boroughs of New York. I initi­
ated informal conversations with salespersons, stock workers and
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T abu- 1.1
Selected characteristics for Macy's, Inc. and Target Corporation, 2011
Macy’s, Inc. Target Corporation
Model Traditional, full-line Discount
U.S. outlets 842 (including 44 
Bloomingdale’s)
1,763
Employees 171,000 365,000
U.S.sales $26.4 billion $68.5 billion
U.S. profit (post-tax) $1.3 billion $2.9 billion
Profit rate 4.8% 4.3%
Sales per employee $154,415 $187,578
Unionization 10% of national workforce None
Sales method Individual: some Collective: no commission;
commissio n; persona 1 storewide sales goals;
sales goals; no cashiers cashiers
Sources: Macy s 2012a; Target Corporation 2012b.
cashiers by asking basic questions about their jobs. If they seemed 
open, I invited them to a formal interview at a nearby cafe or park 
and offered $20 in return. Over the course of fourteen months, 
sixty-two workers (thirty-one from each company) and the presi­
dent of the Macy’s union local sat with me for interviews. During 
the summer of 2013, 1 interviewed an additional thirteen work­
ers from a nonunion Macy s store in the same city. In the course 
of each interview 1 asked questions about work dynamics and 
conditions; about workers’ feelings toward management, cowork­
ers, and customers; and about their individual backgrounds and 
future plans. Each discussion was only semistructured, however, 
and respondents were encouraged to develop their own narratives. 
Table 1.2 provides basic demographics of the seventy-five workers 
interviewed.
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T able 1.2
Sample characteristics, Macy's and Target New York City workers, 2011-13
Macy’s (N=44) Target (N=31)
Job title
Salespersons 82% 61%
Cashiers N/A 19%
Stock clerks 9% 13%
Food servers N/A 6%
Merchandisers 7% N/A
Supervisors 2% 0%
Employment relations
Union members 66% 0%
Full-time 61% 42%
Average hourly wage ($) $11.41 $10.29
Average job tenure (years) 3.5 2.0
Worker cha ract eristics
Average age (years) 28 24
Primary earners 59% 35%
Women 64% 52%
Black 64% 71%
Asian 14% 3%
Latino 7% 13%
White 16% 13%
Foreign-born 34% 45%
Overview
This story unfolds in the next six chapters. Chapter 2 provides 
a historical overview of retail trade and unionism since the early 
twentieth century. It shows how large firms developed relatively 
late in retail and how, because of this, sales work did not become 
highly collectivized until after World War II. Unionism, for its part,
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began among small, independent retailers but shifted to chain and 
department stores in the 1930s and '40s, making rapid gains along 
with the Congress of Industrial Organizations (CIO) upsurge. But 
these gains proved ephemeral, and retail unionism never achieved 
the industry-wide clout of its mass-production peers. The assault 
on labor since the 1980s and the rise of nonunion discounters have 
placed sales workers in an increasingly precarious and hostile or­
ganizing environment.
Chapter 3 begins my comparison of Macy’s and Target, exam­
ining the organization of sales work at these two iconic retailers. 
They display starkly different processes. Macy’s was specialized, 
decentralized, and competitive, with many jobs requiring work­
ers to apply detailed product knowledge. Target, by contrast, was 
routinized and collectivized, with few jobs requiring any measur­
able or transferable skills. I argue that these represent two distinct 
modes of selling: “eroded craft” at Macy’s and “service Toyotism” 
at Target.
In chapter 4 I discuss the social relations that underpinned and 
enabled these regimes. Macy’s had an adversarial culture where 
authoritarian supervision and distrust of managers were com­
mon. Target, for its part, was more “harmonious”: it cultivated 
a Disney-infused teamwork that was deliberately antiunion and 
often enough worked. While both were low-wage employers that 
paid most workers less than twelve dollars an hour, Target, sur­
prisingly, had a two-dollar higher wage floor than unionized Ma­
cy’s. The caveat was that Macy’s wages ranged much higher, and 
its unionized workers had far more security than their nonunion 
peers. Altogether, I argue that Macy’s adversarialism was part and 
parcel of its semiskilled, eroded craft model in which what workers 
did was less understood by managers. In parallel fashion, Target’s 
“teamwork” was both an enabler and result of its de-skilled sales
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process in which managerial control was embedded in the very 
structure of work.
Chapter 5 combines the results of the preceding chapters 
to assess how sales work has changed and where it is heading. 
Using chapter 2 as historical context and Macy’s and Target as 
proxies for older and newer sales models, 1 interrogate the grand 
hypotheses of labor process theory as they pertain to department 
stores. Comparing transformations in work organization, employ­
ment relations, and worker characteristics, I argue that emotional 
labor has undergone de-skilling, that this has been accompanied 
by a shift from adversarialism to paternalism, and that the tran­
sition from a “primary” workforce of self-supporting adults to a 
“secondary’ one of students and dependents has been an integral 
part of these changes. I then outline an emerging regime of “con­
tingent control” in low-wage workplaces. Building upon Edwards’s 
(1979) influential schema, 1 identify four features of this regime 
and pinpoint Target as ideal-typical, unionized Macy’s as a more 
distant predecessor, and nonunion Macy’s as a transitional case.
In chapter 6 1 turn to the question of class consciousness. I ex­
plore service workers’ subjectivity through a four-part prism of 
job identity, solidarity, opposition, and union support. Unionized 
Macy’s workers, as might be expected, showed greater identity and 
opposition and were more prounion than their nonunion peers 
at either firm. But solidarity was much stronger at Target. 1 attri­
bute this to Target’s collectivized, team-based model as compared 
with Macy’s individualized and competitive one. There was little 
to support the idea that service work dulls class consciousness in 
and of itself, since Macy’s workers—union and nonunion—were 
more class conscious while engaging in deeper acting and more 
high-stakes interactions with customers. Jobs at both firms had 
a clear gender gradient, but this created few differential attitudes,
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while Targets softer managerial style seemed to mollify worker re­
sistance.
In the concluding chapter I return to the question of struggle, 
confronting the promises and challenges of organizing service 
workplaces in the twenty-first century. The main obstacles, I argue, 
are fierce employer resistance and limited structural power, which 
has been further eroded by de-skilling. Yet counteracting forces 
are also at work. The routinization of sales is entwined with col­
lectivization, which at Target engendered heightened solidarity—a 
key factor in successful organizing. Furthermore, contingent con­
trol produces new grievances around insecurity that unions can 
take up—and some already have. Unionized Macy’s, however, ex­
poses the shortcomings of many existing unions, as well as their 
indifferent attitude toward many younger members. Insofar as 
services are tending toward collectivized, precarious, and pater­
nalist regimes, it seems that unions must rethink not only their 
tactics and organizing models but also the content of their appeals 
and the definition of membership. The burgeoning campaigns to 
raise wages and respect at Walmart and fast-food chains show that 
this process has already begun. But the pathway to unionism in 
low-wage services can only be aided by a deeper understanding of 
workers’ lived experience, which this book provides.
2
The Making of Big-Box Retail
Capitalism can reproduce itself only by an incessant 
accum ulation which develops as a mass production  
and consum ption  o f com m odities, a phenom enon  
generalized to embrace the sum total o f activities of 
social life.
Michel Aglietta (1979, 81)
In twenty-first-century America, most of us know retail as a ge­neric shopping experience that typically takes place in big-box suburban malls. Most of us are also aware that working in retail is 
often low-paid, precarious, and nonunion. Some, such as Nelson 
Lichtenstein (2006, 2009), argue not only that retail epitomizes 
America’s “bad jobs” phenomenon but that retailers have played 
an outsized role in spreading them since the 1970s. Was this all 
inevitable? Were retail jobs predestined to be low-wage, insecure, 
and nonunion? Or are these the contingent outcomes of twentieth- 
century history? This chapter argues the latter by tracing the devel­
opment of the industry, its labor practices, and retail unions since 
the late nineteenth century.
An undertaking such as this requires some analytic guideposts 
and periodization. For these I turn to the influential regulation 
school of political economy, exemplified by the work of Michel
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Aglietta (1979), Bob Jessop (1982), and Alain Lipietz (1989). Reg­
ulation theorists argue for the existence of long-run periods of 
growth (“regimes of accumulation”) based on particular modes 
of extracting and realizing value. These stable thirty- to-forty year 
stretches are made possible, they say, by supportive state policies 
and social norms (“modes of regulation”) but are bookended by 
acute phases of turmoil and change when the latter no longer suit 
the former. According to Aglietta, the greatest historical divide lies 
between the “extensive” and the “intensive” regimes of accumula­
tion (71). The first, from the Civil War to the late 1920s, consisted 
in an expansion of labor-intensive manufacturing and a decline 
of independent ownership. Taylorism, based on the ideas of Fred­
erick W. Taylor, came to the fore during the second half of this 
period as a method of extracting greater value from workers by 
routinizing their tasks, but because wages remained low, they had 
limited capacity to consume. This limit is often cited as a main 
cause of the Great Depression, which itself is credited with the 
rise of the New Deal and industrial unionism in the United States. 
Emerging from this tumult in 1945 was a new regime often re­
ferred to as “Fordism”: assembly-line technology and widespread 
unionization paired with higher wages and mass consumption for 
many industrial workers. This regime underwent its own crisis in 
the 1970s and transitioned toward what many call “neoliberalism” 
in the 1980s—a regime that encapsulates trends observed during 
the late twentieth and early twenty-first centuries, including wage 
stagnation, globalization, and de-unionization (Harvey 2005).
Here I employ this four-part periodization and the concepts 
of the regulation school to chart U.S. retail's evolution. Within 
each phase, 1 focus on the structure of the industry, the organiza­
tion of selling, and retail unionism. The story that emerges is of 
an industry late to the game of concentration, collectivization,
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and rationalization but one that caught up rapidly in the 1930s 
and ’40s. Retail unions, though held back by minimal disruptive 
power, made impressive advances in certain times and subsectors. 
However, their strategic missteps—and those of the wider labor 
movement—contributed to retail’s predominantly low-road, 
nonunion status today, enabling the rise of what I describe in 
chapter 5 as contingent control.
The Rise of Capitalist Retailing
If capitalist industry, properly understood, consists in large- 
scale organizations producing for a profit, then capitalist retail­
ing arose relatively late. As recently as 1929 independently owned 
stores employing just a handful of clerks (and sometimes none) 
accounted for 89 percent of stores and 70 percent of sales (Lebhar 
1952, 63). Ronald Coase once described corporations as “lumps 
of butter coagulating in a pail of buttermilk” (quoted in Hoopes 
2006, 85); by this metric, American retail was still largely milk at 
the end of the extensive regime of accumulation—one that had 
congealed most manufacturing industries into solid butter.
Nevertheless, tendencies toward concentration and large-scale 
organization were evident. These could be seen most clearly in 
the urban department stores that catered to the elite and upper- 
middle classes; in large chains such as A&P (groceries), J.C. Penney 
(dry goods), and Woolworth's (variety); and in mail-order houses, 
represented by Sears Roebuck and Montgomery Ward. Numeri­
cally, however, small owners predominated before the Great De­
pression. Hundreds of thousands of mom-and-pop shops offered 
everything from groceries to clothing to musical instruments. Ac­
cording to Godfrey Lebhar, each one “specializes in particular lines 
of merchandise, occupies relatively small space, has limited capital,
